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Abstract Service-level agreement (SLA) violations may
lead to losses and user dissatisfaction. Despite the fact that
a service guarantee can increase the satisfaction level of
users, indemnities may not be commensurate with the
importance of a service to a user. While predefined
penalties may be insufficient to compensate for the losses
of one user, another user may not suffer loss from the SLA
violation. With an insurance plan, an insurer can reach an
agreement with users on the premium and loss coverage
volume; insurance can therefore be considered a solution
for providing indemnity which is appropriate to the
importance of service. An insurer cannot protect users
against these losses, which are caused by a single root
event, in the same way as it protects them against the losses
caused by independent events. In this paper, a novel
approach is proposed for providing insurance coverage for
such root events by limiting insurance provisions to the
users with the highest priority. A criterion is presented for
priority assignment to users, and an algorithm is then
proposed for providing insurance according to this priority.
A game-theoretic analysis is also provided to assess
acceptability of the outcome of the proposed algorithm to
rational users and insurers. The results of numerical
experiments demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed
approach for improving the utility of the service.
Keywords Risk aversion  Loss  User satisfaction 
Learning automata
1 Introduction
A service-level agreement (SLA) is a part of a service
contract that contains detailed characterizations of partic-
ular aspects of the service such as its quality and the pro-
vider’s responsibilities. The service provider and the user
agree on these aspects (Hani et al. 2015; Linlin and Buyya
2012). Violation of this agreement by the service provider,
referred to as an SLA violation, may lead to user dissat-
isfaction and a reluctance to renew the service contract
(Sureshchandar et al. 2002). Numerous studies in the lit-
erature aim to offer SLA-based solutions that attempt to
minimize the number of SLA violations (Garg et al. 2014;
Serrano et al. 2013; Wu et al. 2012). However, in many
situations, SLA violations are not preventable, due to
unpredictable failures in service provisioning or system
errors. Service guarantee and penalty payment approaches
(Linlin and Buyya 2012; Wu et al. 2012) are therefore
proposed in order to decrease user dissatisfaction. Despite
existing techniques for the detection of SLA violations
(Aceto et al. 2013; Emeakaroha et al. 2012; Shao et al.
2010), real-world cloud service providers do not use such
techniques and leave the task of providing proof of the
violation to the users (Baset 2012). This policy may not be
satisfactory for a user with a critical or enterprise work-
load. According to Baset (2012), officially-reported SLA
violations receive predefined penalties. However, there are
many situations in which users may not report the SLA
violations to impose these predefined penalties. There are
various reasons for this: an optimistic view suggests that
these users did not suffer loss from the SLA violations and
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have therefore neglected to report the violations; however,
a more pessimistic view suggests that the predefined
penalties may not be sufficient to compensate the users for
the loss. The latter case may have a destructive effect on
the loyalty of users with critical missions. The current
penalty payment approaches are not capable of satisfying
the requirements of users with enterprise workload (Baset
2012). Baset (2012) has proposed that the service provider
should reach an agreement with users on service price and
penalty volume, rather than paying predefined penalties. In
this way, the price and penalty volumes can be defined
appropriately, according to the importance of the service to
the user. One possible approach for providing such
appropriate penalty or indemnity values is to offer an
insurance plan along with the primary service (Bhat-
tacharya and Choudhury 2015; Luo et al. 2010). Users can
choose an appropriate insurance plan to protect themselves
against possible loss and SLA violations. However, pro-
tecting users against events which may cause a large
number of simultaneous SLA violations requires the setting
of high premiums, which is not acceptable. An approach is
therefore required which makes it possible to insure such
events for a fair premium. In this paper, a new approach is
proposed for providing insurance against such events. The
contributions made by this paper are (1) the presentation of
an approach for insuring users against unpredictable events
which may cause a large number of simultaneous losses;
and (2) the presentation of a new criterion for priority
assignment to users in order to improve the average utility
of the service. This criterion also can be employed for user
priority assignment within other problems such as
scheduling or resource provisioning. In addition, the
numerical experiments carried out here demonstrate the
usefulness and applicability of the proposed approach and
criterion to cloud computing applications.
2 Related Work
A service-level agreement is a part of a service contract
which defines the minimal guarantees offered by a service
provider to its users. Particular aspects of the service (for
example quality, responsibilities, and delivery time) may
be agreed between the service provider and the user in a
SLA. A typical SLA, especially within cloud applications,
has the following components (Baset 2012):
• A service guarantee, which identifies the metrics that a
service provider must meet during a service guarantee
period. Some examples of service guarantees are
availability (e.g., 99%), response time (e.g., less than
100 ms), and fault resolution time (e.g., within an
hour). The failure to reach these metrics is known as an
SLA violation, and may result in loss to the user and/or
user dissatisfaction. To restore user satisfaction, the
loss should be compensated.
• A service guarantee period that determines the interval
over which a service guarantee must be met. The time
period can be long (e.g., a year) or short (e.g., the
duration of a transaction). The smaller the time period,
the more stringent is the service guarantee.
• Service guarantee granularity, which determines the
scale of the service guarantee. For example, the
granularity can be defined as per service, per data
center, per instance, or per transaction basis. For
instance, if the uptime of a running instance must be
greater than 99.95%, the service guarantee period
determines the interval over which this uptime should
be met.
• Service credit is the amount credited to the user if the
service guarantee is not met. The amount is paid to the
user in form of penalties or indemnities to reduce user
dissatisfaction.
Service violation detection and reporting determines
who is responsible for detecting the violation of the service
guarantee and the way in which this violation is reported.
The violation of SLAs can damage the loyalty of users over
the long term (Linlin and Buyya 2012). A service provider
which is incapable of attracting new users and retaining its
current users cannot continue in business within oligopoly
markets (Allon and Federgruen 2009; Gro¨nroos 2007).
According to the service management literature (Bowen
and Chen 2001; McDougall and Levesque 2000;
Sureshchandar et al. 2002), there are direct links between
service quality, user utility, user satisfaction, and user
loyalty intention. For example, McDougall and Levesque
(2000) showed that service quality and service utility are
important drivers of user satisfaction; this study also
demonstrated a direct link between user satisfaction and
user loyalty intention. This relationship between service
quality, user satisfaction, and user loyalty is also confirmed
by researches within various service fields such as library
services (Sureshchandar et al. 2002) and hospitality ser-
vices (Bowen and Chen 2001).
Since an SLA violation decreases service quality, it may
dissatisfy users and cause them to switch to other service
providers. Thus, service providers try to prevent SLA
violations. Due to unpredictable failures in service provi-
sioning or system errors, a service entirely free of SLA
violations is beyond the bounds of possibility (Emeakaroha
et al. 2012). Service providers therefore attempt to com-
pensate for the negative effects of low service quality (SLA
violations) by increasing utility through service guarantees
and penalty payment approaches (Garg et al. 2014; Wu
et al. 2012). These approaches can reduce the degree of
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user dissatisfaction (Linlin and Buyya 2012). Since exist-
ing approaches to penalty payments do not take into
account the importance of services to users and involve the
same penalties for all users, they cannot satisfy users with
enterprise workloads (Baset 2012). Baset (2012) has pro-
posed that SLAs and penalty values must in the future be
flexible and appropriate to the importance of the service for
users. One option for providing an indemnity which is
commensurate with the importance of the service to users
is an insurance plan (Bhattacharya and Choudhury 2015;
Luo et al. 2010). Since a premium must be paid for
insurance, a user to whom SLA violations are not a high
priority may simply prefer to use the primary service,
without paying an additional fee for the premium; at the
same time, a user who is sensitive to SLA violations may
pay an appropriate premium and use the appropriate
insurance coverage. There are few existing studies (Bhat-
tacharya and Choudhury 2015; Luo et al. 2010; Naldi
2014) in the literature into providing insurance plans within
cloud environments. In Luo et al. (2010), an insurance
model covering service guarantee, integrity and QoS is
proposed for cloud environments. This work establishes a
framework and reference model using a value-at-risk
approach to establish several suitable mechanisms, and
uses a set of quantifiable metrics; these metrics can be used
as the basis for risk assessment. Finally, these metrics are
also used to calculate premiums for failure of the services.
This work does not discuss risks or events that may cause
many simultaneous losses. Certain events, such as a failure
within a data center, may cause an unacceptable number of
simultaneous losses and SLA violations. According to
economic concepts in insurance (Hogarth and Kunreuther
1992), an insurer cannot protect users against losses which
are caused by a single event in the same way that it protects
them against the losses caused by independent events.
Naldi (2014) proposes an insurance policy subscription
as a complementary approach towards protecting users
from the economic damage resulting from data unavail-
ability. The work investigates the complementary use of
cloud multi-homing and insurance to obtain total risk
coverage against data unavailability. However, the
approach employed for risk assessment and premium cal-
culation is appropriate only for independent events and
risks. Other existing work also treats SLA violations as
independent events; this is not always the case in the real
world, in which events or risks often cause simultaneous
occurrence of many losses. In this paper, an insurance
approach is presented which aims to provide coverage for
numerous losses with a common origin or root. The
insurance approach presented in this paper takes into
account the links between user utility, user satisfaction, and
user loyalty; this approach increases average utility and, as
a consequence, can improve the levels of user satisfaction
and user loyalty to some extent.
3 Proposed Approach
This section describes an approach for providing insur-
ance coverage for many losses incurred by a single event.
For simplicity, such single events are referred to as
common root events (CRE). Although CREs are usually
infrequent, they may lead to a large volume of losses.
Moreover, due to the complexity of cloud environments,
such events are hard to predict. In insurance textbooks,
events that are infrequent, unpredictable, and lead to large
losses are referred to as catastrophes (Dong et al. 1996).
An insurer should take these three features into account
when insuring a pseudo-catastrophe event. This paper
proposes a method for insuring a CRE with an insurance
policy such as (premium, loss), instead of insuring users
against these events separately. In this way, the insurer
can divide or apportion this insurance policy into policies
with smaller granularities. Due to the large number of
losses, the insurance of a CRE, which is similar to a
catastrophe as defined in the insurance literature, requires
a quantification of the loss exceedance probability (LEP)
(Dong et al. 1996). In LEP quantification, a LEP curve
similar to that depicted in Fig. 1 is obtained. Each point
on the curve shows the probability corresponding to a
particular loss size (that is, p0 represents the probability
that the sum of all losses is equal to or greater than L0).
For each cloud service provider, LEP quantification
requires risk assessment involving detailed information on
factors such as resource provisioning policies, workloads,
data centers and networking. However, such LEP quan-
tification is not the focus of this work. Using the LEP
curve and the capital structure of the insurance company,
Fig. 1 A sample loss exceedance probability (LEP) curve
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the insurer determines the maximum loss it can sustain. If
L0 represents the maximum sustainable loss, the insurer
must set a premium pr0 for insuring L0. The values of pr0
and L0 depend on the status of the service provider (i.e.,
workload and reserved resources) and the insurer (i.e.,
premium calculation policy (Zweifel and Eisen 2012)).
To provide insurance coverage for users, the insurer
apportions ðpr0; L0Þ to k insurance policies with smaller
granularity ððpr1; L1Þ; . . .; ðprk; LkÞÞ, such that
(pr0 pr1 þ    þ prk) and (L0 L1 þ    þ Lk). A simple
approach to this allocation is to let (pr1
L1
¼    ¼ prk
Lk
). The
values L1; . . .; Lk constitute the set L, and this represents the
finite set of loss or indemnity values, which are obtained by
querying users. The insurance company can now provide
insurance coverage to k users with ðpri; LiÞ policies
ð1 i kÞ. If there are n insurers in the system and insurer
i provides coverage for k(i) users, then coverage will be
available in total for k users, where k = k(1) ?   ? k(n).
In case of n insurers, L is union of their L sets. These
insurers have their own insurance policies and risk
assessment processes, and may thus offer different policies
(premiums and indemnities). The insurer(s) can provide
insurance only for k users, and an approach is therefore
required for the selection of k users when the insurance
service has more than k applicants. It should be noted that
the approach presented here does not place any restrictions
on k, and that k depends on the capital structure and abil-
ities of the insurer. In this approach, the insurers select the
k users according to priorities assigned by the service
provider. A criterion is therefore presented in Sect. 3.1 for
the assignment of priority to users. Following this, an
approach for pairing the k insurance policies to the k se-
lected users is presented in Sect. 3.2.
3.1 Introducing a Criterion for Priority Assignment
In this section, a criterion is introduced for the assignment
of priority to users which is referred to as risk aversion. A
user is said to be ‘‘risk averse’’ if when confronted with two
choices with the same expected utility, the user prefers the
smaller and more certain of the options. The utility func-
tion of a risk averse user has two main features: u0[ 0 and
u00\0. The former condition represents a user’s preference
for higher amounts of money and wealth over smaller
amounts. This assumption seems perfectly rational. The
latter represents the effect whereby as a user’s wealth
increases, he or she places less value on a fixed increase in
wealth. Given a particular utility function, the user’s risk
aversion can be calculated by u00=u0. The assumption that
human beings behave in a risk-averse manner is plausible
and in accordance with socio-biological arguments
(Zweifel and Eisen 2012).
This work proves that an approach whereby a service
provider assigns a higher priority to more risk-averse users
will improve the user satisfaction level (USL). USL is
defined based on average utility of users as shown in
Eq. (1):
USLðtÞ ¼
X
i2Users
uiðwiðtÞÞ=number of users: ð1Þ
The utility function, u(w), measures the utility that a
user attaches to the monetary amount w. The term wiðtÞ in
Eq. (1) represents the monetary profit of user i using the
service at iteration t. wiðtÞ depends on various parameters
such as price of the service and whether or not the user has
encountered an SLA violation. For example, when it is
likely that a user will experience an SLA violation, the
utility of the user decreases to uiðwiðtÞ  xÞ, where x is a
random variable whose possible values are 0 in normal
conditions, and L in case of an SLA violation. L is the
magnitude of economic damage or loss in case of SLA
violation.
Proposition 1 Consider a situation that n similar users
have requested insurance. They are similar in every
characteristic but risk aversion. When insurers can service
only m requests (m\n), choosing the more risk-averse m
users maximizes USL.
Proof See Online Appendix A (all appendices available
via http://link.springer.com).
A method is now required for the estimation of risk
aversion. It has been shown in the insurance literature that
a more risk-averse individual has more willingness to pay
(WTP) for an insurance premium (Zweifel and Eisen
2012); however, decision making on accepting/rejecting a
premium is not always accurate or identical (Einhorn and
Hogarth 1988). A user may accept differing values of
premiums at different times. Moreover, when a user deci-
des to accept or reject a premium, it is logical to assume
that the user considers the proposition of a 1-year contract
more closely than the proposition of a 1-h contract. When a
user considers a decision more fully, the result better
reflects the importance of the service for the user. How-
ever, since users are not fully rational (Simon 1982) and
information-complete (e.g., unpredictable events may
occur), a greater degree of consideration sometimes cannot
guarantee that a user will make a better decision. In addi-
tion, the length of the SLA (e.g., 1 h vs. 1 year) has a direct
relationship with the number and likelihood of SLA vio-
lations. Therefore, the users’ perception of risks changes
with the time horizon. This compels the consideration of
several other characteristics of the users [e.g., myopic loss
aversion (Benartzi and Thaler 1995)]. Since the focus of
this paper is on risk aversion, it is assumed for simplicity
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that all users are similar in every characteristic except risk
aversion, and that all SLAs have the same length. It should
be noted that there is no limitation on the length of the
SLA, and that this approach is applicable to any length.
When a user must decide frequently on the acceptance or
rejection of premiums, the high level of disparity in these
decisions shows that the importance of a service cannot be
estimated accurately according to these decisions (i.e., the
user will accept a high premium at one time, and reject a
low premium at another). In view of these factors, a
judgment of risk aversion of a user based on a single
decision is not accurate, and the average of these decisions
over time gives a more precise result. This paper uses the
estimation of risk aversion based on a large number of
decisions, and is therefore relatively accurate and reliable.
Since the decision making of a user is not deterministic,
and a user who accepts a premium value at one time may
reject the same premium value at another, a learning tool is
therefore required which is capable of observing the deci-
sions of a user over several iterations and learning the
expected value. A learning automaton is an adaptive
learning unit (Narendra and Thathachar 2012) for a random
and stochastic environment which is capable of learning
through repeated interactions. The choice of action is car-
ried out using a probability vector. By carrying out an
action, the automaton receives a response from the envi-
ronment, and its probability vector is updated according to
this response. Let aiðkÞ 2 aðkÞ denote the selected action
by the learning automaton based on the probability distri-
bution pðkÞ defined over the action set at instant k. The
variable r denotes the number of actions that can be taken.
If the selected action aiðkÞ receives a reward, then the
probability vector pðkÞ is updated using Eq. (2). If it
receives a penalty, Eq. (3) is used instead. The variables
a and b are learning rates, which are associated with the
parameters of the rewards and penalties. If the learning rate
is too low, the convergence may be too slow, and if this
rate is too high, the precision may be too low:
piðnþ 1Þ ¼ piðnÞ þ a½1 piðnÞ i ¼ jð1 aÞpiðnÞ 8i; i 6¼ j

; ð2Þ
piðnþ 1Þ ¼ ð1 bÞpiðnÞ i ¼ jb=ðr  1Þ þ ð1 bÞpiðnÞ 8i; i 6¼ j

: ð3Þ
If (a = b), this learning algorithm is called the linear
reward-penalty, or LRP. If a  b, it is called the learning
reward-e penalty or LReP, and if (b = 0), it is called the
linear reward-inaction algorithm (LRI). A learning
automaton is an appropriate choice for learning within
stochastic environments, and has been successfully used in
a behavioral model of students (Oommen and Hashem
2010) and various patterns (Barto and Anandan 1985). A
learning automaton is therefore utilized here in order to
learn the expected value of the premiums that a user
accepts. The number of actions in learning automata can be
an arbitrary value; however, the values of the first and last
actions are represented by prmin and prmax, respectively.
The values prmin and prmax are the minimum and maximum
values of the premiums pri of the ðpri;LiÞ policies
(1 i k), where Li 2 L. Moreover, for each j (1\ j\ r),
the corresponding value of the (j ? 1)th action is greater
than the corresponding value of the j th action. For each
user, the service provider stores the probability vector of
the learning automata (p(n)) within the user’s profile. When
the user accepts or rejects the insurance policy ðprx; LxÞ, the
service provider updates the probability vector of the
learning automata in the user’s profile, according to the
algorithm in Fig. 2. A long-term measure (MLT ) is defined
using the probability vector of the learning automata as
shown in Eq. (4).
MLT ¼
Xr
i¼1
ðpi  priÞ; ð4Þ
MLT represents the expected premium paid by a user.
According to insurance economic concepts, the amount of
premium paid by a user has a positive correlation with
Fig. 2 Learning algorithm of a
learning automaton
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user’s risk aversion. Therefore, MLT can be considered to
represent risk aversion. A further discussion of the corre-
lation between risk aversion and the premiums paid by a
user is given in Chapter 2 of Zweifel and Eisen (2012).
3.2 Pairing Process
In Sect. 3.1, a criterion was introduced for the assignment
of priority to users. Since the insurers can provide insur-
ance for only k users, this criterion is required to assign
priority to these users. At the start, the service provider
asks the users to determine their required insurance cov-
erage and the maximum premium they want to pay for this
coverage. According to the replies from the users, the
service provider assigns preliminary priorities to the users.
This procedure is also used to generate a preliminary pri-
ority for each new user who joins the current users. At the
first iteration, in order to implement the assignment of
priorities, the k insurance policies are offered to the first k
users with the highest priorities. If k0 insurance policies are
rejected by the k users, these will be offered to the next k0
users with highest priorities at the next iteration and so on.
At each iteration, the priority of a user may change based
on the estimated risk aversion for that user. If a user has set
a low premium at the start, and later realizes that it is not
possible to obtain insurance coverage at the proposed
premium, it is possible to revise this decision in order to
increase the user’s priority. Now, the remaining issue is
that of how k insurance policies should be paired with
k users. When two or more users are interested in one
insurance policy, one of them must be selected. Moreover,
users are autonomous and have the authority to reject an
insurance offer, and it is therefore not certain that all of the
k users will accept all k insurance policies. Thus, a pairing
process is proposed below which pairs users with insurance
policies. In addition, a game-theoretic analysis is presented
to demonstrate the acceptability of the outcome of the
pairing process between rational users and insurers. This
pairing process never pairs an insurance policy x with user
y when there is an unpaired user who is more risk averse
than user y and is interested in insurance policy x. Since
this pairing process pairs the insurance policies to the most
risk-averse users interested in the offered insurance poli-
cies, it therefore maximizes the USL as far as possible,
according to Proposition 1.
In the pairing approach introduced here, there are two
sets of brokers: the user’s brokers (uBrokers) and the
insurer’s brokers (iBrokers). In an iterative process, when
receiving an insurance request from a user, the service
provider initializes a uBroker and assigns the request to the
uBroker. The uBroker is a user profile-aware agent, which
tries to maximize the user’s utility against the insurers. On
the other side there are iBrokers, which are policy-aware
agents of the insurers. Each insurer may have many iBro-
kers. Each iBroker contains one insurance policy, which is
loaded by the insurer. At the beginning of each iteration,
the insurer asks the service provider for certain informa-
tion, such as current workload and the reserved or available
resources, to estimate the probability of loss or SLA vio-
lation. It then generates the insurance policies (apportion-
ing process) and loads them to the iBrokers.
At each iteration, with k uBrokers and k iBrokers, a
uBroker sends its request (which contains a specific
indemnity value from L) to the iBrokers and receives their
proposals for premiums. Some iBrokers may not respond to
the request due to the impossibility of providing insurance
for the received request. In other words, if the requested
indemnity is more than the specified indemnity of the
insurance policy loaded to that iBroker, the iBroker will
not respond to that particular request. Moreover, the pre-
mium proposed by an iBroker should not be smaller than
the premium specified in the insurance policy of that
iBroker. A rational uBroker prefers to reach an agreement
with the iBroker who has proposed the minimum premium.
Thus, using the received proposals, each uBroker creates
its own iList, which is an ordered list of iBrokers based on
their proposed premiums. On the other side, between two
uBrokers, an iBroker prefers to insure the uBroker whose
corresponding user has a higher priority for the service
provider. This means that all iBrokers have an identical list
of uBrokers (uList), which are ordered based on the users’
priority for the service provider. In the following, these
lists (iLists and uList) are referred to as the favorite lists, or
favorites in brief. Note that each iBroker can contract with
only one uBroker and vice versa. Figure 3 shows the pro-
posed algorithm for pairing iBrokers and uBrokers. Using a
game-theoretic analysis, it is shown that the outcome of
this algorithm will be acceptable for rational users and
insurers. Before presenting the game theoretic analysis,
some preliminary definitions and lemmas are presented.
Definition 1 The favorite lists of brokers are cycle-free if
and only if no wrap-around sequence of brokers
b1; b2; . . .; bk (k is even and k[ 2) exists such that each
broker bi prefers biþ1 to bi1 (if i ¼ k then replace i ? 1
with 1). Notice that in b1; b2; . . .; bk, brokers bi1 and biþ1
both have the same type for each i (either uBrokers or
iBrokers) and differ from bi.
Lemma 1 If iBrokers arrange their favorite lists based
on the priority of users, regardless of the favorites of the
uBrokers, the obtained favorites are cycle-free.
Proof See Online Appendix B.
Definition 2 The sets of uBrokers and iBrokers are
pairable if in each iteration of an iterative procedure, two
brokers (one uBroker and one iBroker) can be found which
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prefer each other to all the other existing brokers from the
opposite type in the set. These two brokers are eliminated
from the set for the following iterations. After the last
iteration, the set is empty or contains brokers with the same
type.
Theorem 1 The set of uBrokers and iBrokers is pairable.
Proof See Online Appendix C.
Theorem 1 proves that sets of brokers are pairable. The
pairing algorithm in Fig. 3 gives the procedure for this
pairing. Since each broker acts as an agent for either a user
or an insurer, it must try to maximize its utility. The aim is
then to verify whether or not this pairing satisfies the
rational users and insurers. For this verification process, the
following discussion of this pairing is provided from a
game-theoretic viewpoint. The situation is described in the
form of two games: uGame and iGame. Let riðjÞ denote
uBroker/iBroker j’s rank in the favorite list of iBroker/
uBroker i. S is the set of all strategy profiles that players
can select and si denotes the strategy of player i.
uGame and iGame
uBrokers are players of uGame and iBrokers are con-
sidered to be part of the environment. Since brokers of both
types are rational, they therefore choose the best strategy.
In uGame, the strategy space of the uBrokers is a set of
actions in which each action is equivalent to choosing a
specific iBroker. For each strategy profile s 2 S, the utility
of uBroker i is uiðsÞ ¼ n riðjÞ þ 1 if and only if si ¼ j
(choosing iBroker j) and there is not another uBroker k
ðk 6¼ iÞ such that sk ¼ j and rjðkÞ\rjðiÞ; otherwise,
uiðsÞ ¼ 0. The definition of iGame is similar to uGame,
although here, the iBrokers are the players of the game.
Game-Theoretic Analysis
Theorem 2 The outcome of the pairing algorithm is a
pure Nash equilibrium point of uGame and iGame.
Proof See Online Appendix D.
Theorem 3 Both iGames and uGames have a unique
pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) point.
Proof See Online Appendix E.
According to Theorems 2 and 3, the outcome of the
pairing algorithm is equivalent to the unique pure Nash
equilibrium point of iGame and uGame. In games with a
unique pure Nash equilibrium point, playing the best
response strategy converges to that unique PNE (Nisan
et al. 2011). This means that the outcome of the playing of
the best response and the pairing algorithm are equivalent.
Therefore, the result of the pairing algorithm satisfies the
condition of rationality of uBrokers and iBrokers.
3.3 Applications of the Proposed Approach
The approach proposed in this paper can be employed for
providing insurance coverage for various risks or events
which are the roots of simultaneous losses for many users,
Fig. 3 Pseudo-code for the pairing algorithm
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such as resource provisioning failures, particularly the
facing of unexpected loads (Javadi et al. 2012), insecure or
incomplete data deletion (Catteddu 2010), a malicious
insider (Catteddu 2010), users’ security expectations
(Catteddu 2010), compromise of the management interface
(Catteddu 2010), and isolation failure (Catteddu 2010), to
name just a few examples. To employ the proposed
approach, the following questions should be considered:
1. What can happen (i.e., what can go wrong)?
2. How likely is it that it will happen (i.e., probability
estimate)?
3. If it does happen, what are the consequences (i.e.,
impact estimate)?
Probabilistic risk assessment approaches can be
employed to answer these questions. Using the answers
to these questions, an LEP curve can be produced for
the risks. Following this, the insurer(s) should deter-
mine the maximum loss it (they) can sustain. Finally,
the insurer(s) should generate insurance policies
ðprx;LxÞ, which provide different levels of coverage (Lx)
for the users. One alternative for defining indemnities
(Lx) which are appropriate to the importance of service
to users is to log the indemnities requested by users and
revise the insurance policies over the following itera-
tions if necessary.
4 Numerical Experiments
In this section, numerical experiments are conducted to
show the benefits of the proposed approach. For this pur-
pose, a user model is first defined in Sect. 4.1, which is
employed to simulate a user within the numerical experi-
ments. The definition of such models is usual in the eco-
nomic literature (Allon and Federgruen 2009). Numerical
experiments are also carried out in Sect. 4.1 to evaluate
whether the behavior of the proposed user model corre-
sponds to the behavior of a rational user in the real world.
Since ranking users based on their risk aversion plays a key
role in the approach proposed here, a learning automaton-
based method is presented for creating ordered lists of
users. In Sect. 4.2, the capability of a learning automaton to
learn a value for MLT is first evaluated. MLT is used to
create ordered lists of the users. This ordered list is then
used to select a subset of the users to whom insurance will
be offered. The average utility of the subset of users chosen
in this way is compared with the case where the subsets are
selected randomly. The results show that the proposed
approach maximizes the average utility of the users as far
as possible, and as a consequence improves the user sat-
isfaction level.
4.1 User Model
Equation (5) shows the utility function of a user within the
user model presented here. This function satisfies the
requirements for the utility function of a risk averse user
(u0i[ 0 and u
00
i\0). The value wi represents the user’s asset
and ci is a constant. Since the risk aversion of a user can be
calculated using u00=u0 (see Sect. 3.3), then in the pre-
sented model, ai is the risk aversion of a user.
uiðwiÞ ¼ ci expðaiwiÞ  ci ðci\0; ai[ 0Þ: ð5Þ
Let ðpr; xÞ denote an insurance policy where pr is the
premium for insuring a loss x. The user will decide whether
to accept or reject this insurance policy. In the model
presented in this paper, the utility function is used for
decision making. As illustrated in Fig. 4, the utility func-
tion of a risk-averse user (uðwÞ) is an increasing and con-
cave function. Under normal conditions, the utility of a
user is uðw0Þ. However, if there is an SLA violation (e.g.,
service unavailability or low service quality), the utility of
the user decreases to uðw0  xÞ. Now let the probability of
an SLA violation or abnormal conditions be p. The
expected utility of the user in such risky conditions is
p uðw0  xÞ þ ð1 pÞ  uðw0Þ, which is equal to uðwsÞ
as shown in Fig. 4. Due to this equality, the premium
ðw0  wsÞ makes a risk-averse user indifferent to the choice
between a certain asset ws and one with a risky asset w0
(which may decrease to ðw0  xÞ). A fully rational user
with complete information accepts any premium smaller
than ðw0  wsÞ and rejects one greater than ðw0  wsÞ.
Since users in the real world are not fully rational (Si-
mon 1982) and may make errors in decisions, a level of
noise is therefore added to the decision of the user in this
model. For simplicity, it is assumed that the user accepts
the premium ðw0  wsÞ with probability 0.5 (since at this
value of the premium, the user is indifferent to the choice
between certain and risky conditions) and this probability
Fig. 4 Utility function of a risk-averse user
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increases as the premium decreases. Equation (6) shows
the simple equation used in the user model to determine the
acceptance or rejection of an insurance policy:
paccept ¼ 2ðw0  wsÞ  premium
2ðw0  wsÞ : ð6Þ
To evaluate the proposed user model, insurance policies
are offered to five different users, and this is modelled
using the proposed method.
These users are similar in every characteristic except
risk aversion. For all users, wi = 1 and ci = -100. The
risk aversion (ai) is 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 for user types 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5, respectively. The insurance policies offered to
these users are (0.01, 0.1), (0.01, 0.5), (0.1, 0.8) and (0.2,
0.8). The first and second insurance policies differ in
terms of coverage volume, and the third and the fourth
policies differ in terms of premium. The vertical axis in
Fig. 5 shows the probability (paccept) of a particular user
type accepting an insurance policy. The horizontal axis
shows the probability of incurring loss x (px). According
to Zweifel and Eisen (2012), a risk-averse user is more
likely to accept an insurance policy ðpri; xiÞ than a less
risk-averse user. As shown in Fig. 5, the behavior of the
proposed user model corresponds to that in the real
world. Moreover, these figures show that when pri has a
negative correlation with paccept, xi has a positive corre-
lation with paccept. This means that the behavior of the
proposed user model also corresponds to the behavior of
a rational real user in this respect. Moreover, according
to these diagrams, when the insurance coverage is non-
trivial and px has a small value (e.g., px\0:1), the
probability paccept shows significant differences between
different user types. As px increases, the differences tend
towards zero.
Since the probabilities of loss in real services are usually
very small, paccept therefore shows significant differences
for different user types. In view of these differences, the
probabilities of accepting insurance policies are expected
to be closely related to the risk aversion of users.
It should be noted that the service provider is unaware of
the user’s utility function and decision-making method; it
simply observes the acceptance or rejection of an insurance
policy by a user and estimates the risk aversion of a user
based on these observations.
4.2 Evaluations and Results
In this section, the capability of a learning automaton to
learn MLT is presented. The evaluation involves five users,
modelled with the user model described above. A set of
insurance policies, {(0.01, 0.1), (0.01, 0.5), (0.03, 0.3),
(0.03, 0.5), (0.05, 0.5), (0.1, 0.5), (0.1, 0.8), (0.2, 0.8)}, are
offered to the users in an iterative procedure. A learning
automaton with five actions is applied for each user. The
corresponding values for actions 1–5 are 0.01, 0.03, 0.05,
0.1 and 0.2, respectively. When an insurance policy is
offered to a user, it is either accepted or rejected. Based on
the user’s response, the probability vector of the learning
automata is updated according to the algorithm shown in
Fig. 2.
Figure 6a illustrates the evolution of the probability
vector of the learning automaton over 1000 iterations for a
Fig. 5 Comparison of acceptance probabilities of insurance policies by different user types: a (0.01, 0.1); b (0.01, 0.5); c (0.1, 0.8); d (0.2, 0.8)
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user of type 1. The learning rate of the algorithm LRP [a
and b in Eqs. (2) and (3)] in this experiments is 0.01.
Figure 6b illustrates the learned values for MLT using
Eq. (4) for the different user types. As illustrated in this
diagram, the value of MLT has a positive correlation with
the risk aversion of a user. For user selection purposes,
only an ordered list of users based on their risk aversion is
required, rather than the exact values of risk aversion;
therefore, MLT can be used as a criterion for creating an
ordered list of users according to their risk aversion. In
order to evaluate the impact of the proposed approach on
the average utility of the users, it is assumed that there are
500 users, modelled using the user model described in
Sect. 4.1. These users have the same parameter values and
differ only in the degree of risk aversion. The values for
risk aversion for these users are {0.02, 0.04, 0.06,…, 9.96,
9.98, 10}. For simplicity, it is assumed that in this iterative
scenario, all users are interested in buying insurance, but
that it is not possible to provide insurance coverage for all
of them and that a subset of users must therefore be
selected. The average utility of users (USL) is then com-
pared in two different modes: a random mode, in which
members of the subset are selected randomly from the
users, and a risk aversion-based (RA-based) mode, in
which members of the subset are selected from ordered
lists and are the most risk-averse users.
Figure 7a illustrates the average utility of users in these
modes. The horizontal axis shows the possibility of losses,
Fig. 6 a Evolution of the probability vector of a learning automaton when employed for learning MLT for user type 1; b the learnt MLT for
different user types
Fig. 7 Comparison of the average utility of users (USL) in random and RA-based modes, when the percentage of the insured users is a 25%;
b 50%; c 75%
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which has a small value in [0, 0.02]. Small values (interval
[0, 0.02]) are selected since losses are infrequent in the real
world. The vertical axis shows the average utility of users
when only 25% of the users can buy insurance. As illus-
trated by this figure, users can always obtain better average
utility in the RA-based mode, and this difference increases
as the possibility of losses increases. Figure 7b, c shows the
same diagrams for the cases where 50 and 75% of users
have the opportunity to buy insurance. As illustrated by
these figures, users in these cases also always obtain better
average utility in the RA-based mode. To analyze the
difference between the average utility of the users in both
modes, a statistical t test is employed over the obtained
average utilities. Table 1 shows the obtained p level values.
The p level is the significance level of the difference
between average utilities in random and RA-based modes.
The difference in average utility between the two modes is
considered to be significant if the p level is less than 5%.
Since the p levels for the 25, 50 and 75% cases are 0.01,
0.78 and 0%, respectively, these differences are therefore
significant. For reference, if the p level is 1%, there is a 1 in
100 chance that this difference is produced by chance. The
results of the t test (t score) for the 25, 50 and 75% cases
are 3.88, 2.69 and 4.81, respectively.
5 Limitations and Conclusion
In this paper, an approach is presented for providing
insurance coverage for events which may lead to many
simultaneous SLA violations and losses. According to the
insurance literature, an insurer cannot protect users against
many losses caused by a single event in the same way that
it protects them against the losses caused by independent
events. To provide insurance coverage for such events, the
insurer should set a premium which is high enough not
only to cover the expected losses but also to protect itself
against the possibility of experiencing catastrophic losses.
Setting high premiums in environments such as the cloud is
not appropriate and increases the total cost of service. The
existing studies on providing insurance in cloud environ-
ments have not considered these correlated losses and SLA
violations. Since such events are infrequent, this feature
can be used to provide acceptable insurance coverage for
users. To protect an insurer against the possibility of
experiencing catastrophic losses, a restriction is placed on
the number of users who can use insurance in the proposed
approach. Using this method, the maximum total loss that
the insurer must pay to users falls below a sustainable
amount. The number of users who can take advantage of
insurance depends on the capital structure of the insurer;
for a large insurance company, all users may buy insurance
coverage. In this paper, a pairing process is proposed for
the selection of this subset the users. This pairing process
never selects user A when there is another unselected user
who is more risk-averse than user A and is also interested
in the insurance offer. Since the pairing process selects the
most risk-averse users, it maximizes the average utility of
users according to Proposition 1. This paper also demon-
strates that risk aversion can be used as a useful criterion
for assignment of priority to users.
In addition to risk aversion, there are several other
concepts from the field of behavioral economics and psy-
chology of decision making which can be used in service
management applications. For example, the combination of
loss aversion and a short evaluation period, which is
referred to as myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler
1995), can be used to define and specify the appropriate
length for SLAs. When users are loss-averse, they will be
more willing to accept risky conditions if they evaluate
their performance infrequently. Therefore, given risky
conditions and users with high loss aversion, it appears that
offering short-length SLAs will not be profitable for a
service provider in the long term. However, more research
into such concepts and psychological characteristics is
needed to make them useful for service management
applications. Another issue in the provision of insurance
coverage is the relationship between a service provider and
an insurer (insurance provider). A service provider can
provide insurance coverage itself or through a third party
insurer. In the latter case, the problem of trust between the
insurer and the service provider must be considered. For
example, the insurer must ensure that SLA violations are
not intentional. Since the problem of trust does not fall
within the scope of this paper, it is not discussed here;
however, it is an important problem in real applications.
Numerous prior works in the literature exist (Atif 2002;
Siyal and Barkat 2002; Xiong and Liu 2002) regarding
building trust within different systems, and these can be
used to inspire the building of trust between a service
provider and an insurer. The results obtained in numerical
experiment illustrate the usefulness of the proposed
approach for providing insurance coverage in improving
the average utility of users. A game-theoretic analysis is
also provided to verify the acceptability of the approach
using rational users and insurers.
Table 1 Results of t test on the average utility of users using random
selection vs. risk aversion-based selection
Insurance coverage (%) p level (%) t score
25 0.01 3.88
50 0.78 2.69
75 0 4.81
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